Kunduz, Allies and Sisyphean Efforts

It has been just over a month since the US airstrikes that struck a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, and the tragedy has all but fallen from our consciousness. Yet outside the United States, it still gets gets plenty of attention–most quite critical of the U.S. military and government. While I believe it is yet another example of our Sisyphean pursuit of ‘success’ in Afghanistan, I disclose that have a personal connection to the clinic at Kunduz through a friend that was a trauma physician there until she left a few months ago.

The results of preliminary investigations are roiled in controversy and mystery. To what extent is this a tragic example of collateral warfare or incompetence? Sadly, there are also more sinister theories: Many observers and certainly MSF are concerned that the clinic’s medical impartiality and willingness to treat enemy combatants led to the call for fire.

Incidents like these, regardless of who’s to blame, risk suggesting that the U.S. military accepts civilian casualties. Nothing could be further from the truth. Tragedies like the one in Kunduz make military success harder to achieve. Combat veterans know with unambiguous clarity the permanent results of war: decisions to kill people are made with imperfect information, and sometimes, the people killed are not the ones you intended to kill.

We can be quick to accuse American military forces in the Kunduz incident, but any American “lapse” was trusting an imperfect partner. In battle, you need allies–which means you unequivocally respond to a call for fire from a ‘friend.’ You respond, even with the knowledge that these decisions are made under stress with imperfect information because your friends are under attack.

I look forward to the findings of public investigations. The results should lead two outcomes:  Criminal prosecution of anyone that knowingly called for fire on a hospital, and acceptance that we can’t find perfect allies in Afghan partners.

Life is never as simple as “Sheep, Wolves, and Sheep Dogs.”  In war, as in life, our partners evolve; friends can become foes, and people we have fought alongside us develop into abhorrent enemies.  Unfortunately we can’t avoid conflict altogether; there is a breaking point that justifies a military response. That said, an almost universally accepted example like Holocaust is rarer than less clear examples like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Short of an unreserved war where extensive collateral damage is accepted, we need local allies to differentiate between good and evil. Perhaps even more importantly, we need those allies to ultimately share enough of an interest in our desired outcome to maintain the new status quo after war subsides. If we cannot find those allies, what are the lasting aims we hope to achieve through military engagement?

Coupling the preliminary reports surrounding Kunduz with the well documented shortcomings of Afghan political leaders and documented pedophilia amongst our Afghan allies, it is becoming increasingly evident that we either do not have the ability to identify allies acceptable to our value system or that they do not exist in a meaningful capacity.

If we cannot find the allies we need, we will fail to achieve our diplomatic and security aims. After 13 years of war, perhaps we should reevaluate the art of the possible and considering leading with other tools like comprehensive education, agricultural empowerment, and legitimate trade programs. We will quickly find committed allies in the people and organizations that make personal sacrifices in order to maintain these programs, rather than those that flourish in the violence we unwittingly perpetuate.